Posts Tagged 'copyright'



Strike One?

This week’s big intellectual property news was the judgment of Mr. Justice Charleton in EMI & ors v. UPC. The case was the latest plank in the record industry‘s campaign to force the introduction of a graduated response to online copyright infringement.

Charleton J’s judgment is long and there is a lot to get through.  I haven’t had the opportunity to read the judgement fully but a few highlights already stand out:

  • Evidence was adduced by the plaintiffs to justify claims that many thousands of tracks are illegally downloaded. Justin Mason looks at some of those claims and finds that, by the same logic, an album he invented on the spot has been downloaded 24,752 times. This evidence, which appears to be highly flawed, has already been represented as fact in the Seanad.
  • In 2009 Charleton J granted an order requiring eircom to block access to The Pirate Bay. As noted by TJ McIntyre at the time, the judgment was of limited value as it was not opposed by eircom and was delivered ex tempore. Simon McGarr points out that Charleton J now finds he was incorrect in granting that order. According to his latest judgment:

I regret that my previous judgement in the matter was wrong. The legislative basis enabling me to act in that way does not exist in Irish law as it exists in other European jurisdictions.

  • If eircom had contested that order, Charleton J may have been in a position to reach the decision now indicated in the UPC judgement. It’s an important point, as he also gave judgment clearing data protection concerns raised by the Data Protection Commissioner in relation to the graduated response settlement. That case was similarly unopposed and the Commissioner did not appear due to cost concerns.
  • Charleton J has repeatedly characterised online copyright infringement as theft and anyone engaged in downloading files in breach of copyright to be in the criminal sphere. Eoin O Dell draws attention to interesting posts on the question of whether or not copyright infringement is theft.

Why people care about The Record Industry v. The Customer

Cory Doctorow makes some good points on the use and abuse of copyright law, in response to some pretty churlish criticism recently directed his way. I particularly liked this:

… I don’t care if you want to attempt to stop people from copying your work over the internet, or if you plan on building a business around this idea. I mean, it sounds daft to me, but I’ve been surprised before.

But here’s what I do care about. I care if your plan involves using “digital rights management” technologies that prohibit people from opening up and improving their own property; if your plan requires that online services censor their user submissions; if your plan involves disconnecting whole families from the internet because they are accused of infringement; if your plan involves bulk surveillance of the internet to catch infringers, if your plan requires extraordinarily complex legislation to be shoved through parliament without democratic debate; if your plan prohibits me from keeping online videos of my personal life private because you won’t be able to catch infringers if you can’t spy on every video.

Via Adrian Weckler.

Lesser known crimes: do you own that copyright?

The second in my irregular series of lesser known crimes, like the first, relates to unlawfully claiming ownership of an intellectual property right.

Section 141 of the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 provides:

A person who, for financial gain, makes a claim to enjoy a right under this Part [ie. copyright] which is, and which he or she knows or has reason to believe is, false, shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to a fine not exceeding £100,000, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years, or both.

The penalties are far more serious that those applicable to the trade mark offence. It was introduced to the legislation as an amendment proposed by the then Labour Senator Brendan Ryan, who proposed a maximum penalty of £10 million. He saw it as a necessary counterbalance to the “draconian powers” afforded to copyright owners in the legislation.

[T]here is nothing to suggest that a person who, maliciously and for monetary gain, abuses those powers would pay a penalty other than through the civil courts – even that is patchy and requires clarification … if such a scale of unprecedented powers is to be granted, there must be a balanced penalty for abuse of those powers.

Section 141 is the type of offence companies like YouTube are talking about when they say in their copyright notice:

Be aware that there may be adverse legal consequences in your country if you make a false or bad faith allegation of copyright infringement by using this process. Don’t make false claims!

However, the process they refer to is their own notice-and-takedown procedure and the adverse legal consequences under section 141 require that the claim is made for financial gain. I expect that section 141 was envisaged as addressing false claims for damages. While I’m not aware of any prosecutions under section 141,  it is conceivable that someone could gain from having someone’s videos removed from YouTube (eg. if the complainant ran a paid site featuring the same video under licence).

A known unknown in eircom’s “three strikes” system

Adrian Weckler has published a copy of the intended notification to be issued by eircom to its customers when accused of unlawful filesharing by the Irish recording industry (represented by IRMA). It is, as warning letters go, extremely polite.

I mentioned last month that this “three strikes” system agreed between IRMA and eircom was approved by the High Court (for data protection purposes) on the basis that IRMA would not know “that the infringer is a particular person living in a particular place in Ireland”. In fact, Charleton J. said that all IRMA will “know is that a particular IP address has been involved in the downloading.” However, it appears that DtecNet, who will collect IP addresses for IRMA, has the capability to collect more information than just IP addresses. Whether such capabilites are to be used as part of the IRMA/eircom system is not known.

My suspicions were raised by eircom’s statement on their website that IRMA will send notifications to eircom “containing among other things the IP addresses of individuals”. Such suspicions could be unfounded; for example, IRMA might be sending eircom a list of shared files along with the IP addresses and that information might not be personal data.

However, the template letter reproduced by Adrian says:

Some of the details of the notification supplied by IRMA are set out below …

Is it not strange that eircom repeatedly notes that IRMA will be supplying them with more details than are apparently necessary for the purposes of the three strikes system.

What are those details?

Details of eircom’s 3-strikes system, but who will know what?

The graduated response system to tackle unlawful filesharing online, agreed as part of an out-of-court settlement between the Irish recording industry and eircom, was approved by the Irish High Court last month. Mr. Justice Charleton’s judgment concluded that the “parties can … lawfully proceed to implement the settlement”, though his judgment relates only to the specific question of compatibility with the Data Protection Acts 1988 and 2003.

© Time Magazine

Strike 1 to the record industry

eircom has now implemented the graduated response system on a pilot basis and details are available on its website. The FAQs say that IRMA will supply eircom with IP addresses which eircom will match to its customers, who will then receive warnings about alleged unlawful downloading. If warnings are ignored, service may be suspended for 7 days and the customer will not be charged for those 7 days of lost service. On a subsequent alleged infringement, service will be withdrawn for 12 months. If a customer disputes an allegation that their service has been used for unlawful downloading, they can appeal to the eircom, who “will consider all customer appeals on a case by case basis.”

The concerns about graduated response primarily arise out of disconnection on the basis of complaint, rather than court order, and that the sanction affects an entire household, rather than the individual alleged infringer. The latter point has gathered steam as the internet has taken on utility status. IRMA’s attitude to this is clear:

The European Parliament has been talking about internet access as a basic human right. It absolutely is not.

Dick Doyle, IRMA Director General

eircom emphasises that customer data will not be shared by eircom with any other party.

Under no circumstances will eircom be handing over customer details to any third party.

It is also stated that eircom won’t monitor network usage and that “[t]here are strict privacy laws that prohibit eircom from monitoring the online activities of individual customers.” Monitoring will be done by DtecNet on behalf of IRMA.

However, in the overview, eircom states:

IRMA will send eircom notifications containing among other things the IP addresses of individuals they have detected as engaging in illegal file sharing in breach of copyright.

One wonders what those “other things” might be. Charleton J. said:

Neither DtecNet, or any similar service of detection, nor any of the plaintiffs whose copyright material is being infringed would ever know through this process that the infringer is a particular person living in a particular place in Ireland. What they do know is that a particular IP address has been involved in the downloading.

However, DtecNet’s website states:

DtecNet’s solutions will automatically secure evidence against the infringer(s) and generate Cease & Desist letters that can be sent to the infringer(s) asking for immediate removal of the content.

This is a capability of their systems, not a detail of the IRMA/eircom agreement. But nevertheless, it appears that IRMA may be capable of gathering more than just IP addresses of alleged infringers. eircom might not share customer data with any other party, but it is not clear what data will be shared with it.

The IMRO/YouTube licence

IMRO’s licensing methods has been a hot topic recently due to its demand that Irish music bloggers pay licence fees to play music on their sites. While non-profit bloggers are understandably disappointed to learn that they may have to pay €150-€300 annually to host music, even if the musicians have provided them with the music, such a licensing scheme does not threaten to destroy the native music scene, as some have suggested.

Workarounds are possible and Nialler9, along with many comments, have pointed to the possibility of simply linking to the relevant songs if they are hosted elsewhere. One such possible host is YouTube, which reached a licence agreement with IMRO/MCPSI this year. Little detail of that licensing deal is available on IMRO’s website and no information appears to be available on YouTube’s website. So I began to wonder: does the IMRO/YouTube licence cover synchronisation rights?

Copyright can be carved up a number of ways and a copyright owner can licence or assign different parts or uses of their works. For example, on joining IMRO, a musician assigns his/her performing rights to IMRO. This means that IMRO collects royalties for that right on behalf of the musician and the musician no longer has any performing rights in the music covered by IMRO. Therefore, if an IMRO member sets up a blog and streams his/her own music on that blog, (s)he will still need an IMRO licence to do so.

Synchronisation rights are the part of copyright that cover the use of work in conjunction with other media. A common example is advertising: when you use a backing track in a television ad, you need a synchronisation right licence because you are synchronising the music with film footage. In everyday language people might refer to seeking permission or clearance to use the music – what is being sought is a synchronisation licence.

If you made an ad for a once-off broadcast at an event, such as on big screens at a music festival, you (or the festival organisers) would need:

  1. a synchronisation right licence to make the ad;
  2. an IMRO/MCPSI licence; and
  3. a PPI licence.

MCPSI (effectively a limb of IMRO) can provide synchronisation licences for some music but this must be checked on a song-by-song basis and some songs must be licensed directly from the musician. Generally, the more successful the artist, the more likely a licence is required directly from them (and the more expensive that licence will be).

It would appear that the IMRO/YouTube deal covers the playing of music on YouTube in the same way a music festival might get an IMRO licence. That does not mean, to take my example above, that the synchronisation of music in an ad is necessarily covered. Some music on YouTube is uploaded by the record company or artist responsible along with the music video that accompanies it and therefore no new synchronisation occurs. However, a huge amount of YouTube videos involve new synchronisation: whether involving the use of music as a backing track to a home movie or where a user has created their own music video to accompany a song.

I asked IMRO if these uses are covered by the licence agreed with YouTube and a definitive answer was not available. However, it appears that:

  • The IMRO/YouTube deal allows the use of music with third-party video if the musician has assigned their synchronisation rights to MCPSI or a foreign equivalent which has a co-operation agreement in place with MCPSI.
  • If the musician has retained their synchronisation rights, individual permission must be sought where music is to be used in conjunction with third-party video.
  • This means that, despite the IMRO/YouTube licence, certain musicians might still be able to have videos taken down or the sound removed from them.

If this summary of the position is correct, full rights clearance of a video uploaded to YouTube requires a song-by-song check with MCPSI to see if that song is covered by the IMRO/YouTube deal.

IMRO vs. The Blogs: collective licensing of music

©  Time Inc

"The collective licensing revenue streams, they are a-changin'."

Controversy broke out this week when Nialler9, an influential Irish music blogger, publicised IMRO’s demand that music bloggers pay for a Online Exploitation Licence. [Update: a group of Irish music bloggers met with IMRO on 6 May 2010 to discuss their concerns. Read about the meeting here.]

Like many blogs, most Irish music blogs are run at no, or very little, profit. Comments on the main posts about the issue generally share a sense of outrage and a belief that IMRO’s demands will damage new Irish music.

Incredulity is also expressed that the bands involved generally provide the music to the bloggers in the hope that it will be promoted online. The Guardian sums up the issue as follows:

If IMRO goes ahead with its plan, targeting music blogs around the world, there will soon be legions of frustrated bloggers. And it will be much worse if other regional publishers follow suit. While the organisations’ hearts may be in the right place – looking to buoy a flagging industry – we just hope they are going about it the right way. Will forcing the closure amateur music blogs make songwriters richer? Or precisely the reverse?

Collective licensing is a somewhat complicated area but it is reasonably certain that, whatever enforcement steps IMRO might or might not take against individual bloggers that refuse to buy a licence, it is highly unlikely that any agreement will be reached to exclude blogs from the licensing regime. [Update: However, it appears from the meeting between music bloggers and IMRO, mentioned above, that a new form of non-commercial licence might be considered.]

Collective copyright licensing

Individual collection of royalties from music users by music owners is extremely impractical. Therefore, a system of collective licensing has been established where by a licensing society can be set up, with rights to grant licences to play music on behalf of a class of copyright owners. The Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 provides that music can be played in public or broadcast if the appropriate fees have been paid to the relevant licensing society.

The most well-known such society in Ireland is IMRO, which collectively licenses the performance rights of copyright musical material (ie. the part of a musician’s copyright relating to the public performance of their work). It collects over €30 million in royalties annually, which are distributed to its members.

There are other collecting societies that license other copyright works, such as the Newspaper Licensing Agency and the Irish Visual Artists’ Rights Organisation. IRMA is an association of record labels and is not a collecting society.

Comments on the blog posts already mentioned point to the fact that the musicians involved authorise the use of their music on a particular music blog. Nialler9 refers to his understanding of the situation, prior to hearing from IMRO.

Like many I thought that MP3s which were cleared by bands and labels for promo were provided as is – gratis and without any attachments or additional requirements other than to promote the band and song. Y’know, the same way an entire music blogosphere and a digital PR industry has been allowed to grow up over the course of the last 10 years thinking the same.

However, musicians can only licence the rights which they retain. If they have joined IMRO, they have entered into an agreement with the organisation. The first substantive clause (clause 2) of that agreement provides that the musician is assigning (ie. transferring) all their performing rights to IMRO.

Accordingly, IMRO members cannot grant a blogger a licence to the performing right in their music because they no longer own that right.

Controversy

The collective licensing system has not been uncontroversial. Similar arguments to those now raised by music bloggers were aired over a decade ago by independent retailers and coffee shop owners who felt that they should not have to pay an IMRO licence fee to promote new and local musicians in their premises.

One might wonder why IMRO has begun to target bloggers now; the answer probably lies in the comment quoted above from the Guardian. As music use changes, collecting societies are tracking new and increasing sources of revenue from such use.

In 2004, the European Commission warned sixteen collecting bodies that an agreement between them was potentially in breach of competition law on the basis that it proposed to carve up online music licensing on a national basis. The Commission published a recommendation in 2005 which said that the industry should be free to set up EU-wide collecting societies or to allow national societies to licence on an EU-wide basis.

Disputes

In Ireland, the Controller of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks deals with disputes regarding royalty rates charged by collecting societies.

[A]nyone who considers that they have unreasonably been refused a licence by a collecting society or considers the terms of an offered licence to be unreasonable may refer the matter to the Controller.

The terms of an offered licence include the proposed royalties or licence fees.

IMRO is not a one-stop shop

So: permission from a musician does not necessarily extend to a licence to use music online; neither does an IMRO licence give a full licence to use the music.

This is a common misunderstanding. Different venues and uses may require a combination of licences from IMRO/MCPSI, PPI, the record label responsible for the recording and/or the songwriter. For certain commercial uses of specific pieces of music, a licence from all of these parties might be required. Therefore, it is important to check with IMRO or a professional adviser as to what licences are necessary.

A Clatter of the Law & World Intellectual Property Day 2010

Today is World Intellectual Property day, the day on which the World Intellectual Property Organization would like public awareness of IP to be heightened. It is not, perhaps, the most exciting of international days of observance, but is a fitting one on which to explain the title to this blog.

This is not exclusively, or even primarily, an IP blog, though as a former full-time IP/IT lawyer it strays into that territory from time to time. The title of the blog, however, does relate to IP law and arises out of an anecdote of my late father’s.

My grandfather, Bryan MacMahon, was a school teacherwriter and balladmaker. He spent a lot of time travelling the country to collect ballads that might otherwise be lost and composed ballads of his own.

Given the place of oral tradition in the world of ballads, it sometimes happened that ballad singers would lose track of who wrote a particular ballad and they might be designated “Anon” or “Traditional”. The balladmaker with an eye on his IP would, of course, make it known publicly that the ballad in question was not traditional or of anonymous origin, but his or her own copyright.

Sometimes, however, there was a conscious effort to “forget” the original balladmaker and a balladsinger might claim something as his own. One such episode of forgetfulness became known to my father and resulted in the following cease and desist poem:

FOR A PLAGIARIST.
Some men take your character,
Some men filch your purse,
But a bard who steals a dead man’s verse
Is a thief who is far, far worse.

You stole pennies from a dead man’s eyes,
As mean as I ever saw,
And if you try it once again,
You’ll get a clatter of the law!

Upon hearing this, the alleged infringer exclaimed delight and requested ten copies.

Comhaltas Ceoltóirí Éireann have an excellent new online archivelaunched recently, which includes interviews with Bryan MacMahon about ballads (eg. “What’s a ballad?” and “Ballad competitions“) and recordings of Garry McMahon (eg. “Thousands are sailing to America” and “Yorkshire Pigs“).

Graduated response now de facto law in Ireland

[Updates at end] The Irish record industry, like its international siblings, has given up pursuing individuals in its war on filesharing and is focusing instead on the use of “three strikes” disconnection, sometimes referred to as graduated response. This involves a rightsholder, usually a record label or movie studio, notifying an ISP that it believes a particular IP address has been used for unlawful downloading of copyright material. On the third complaint, the ISP disconnects the user of that IP address.

The Irish industry took a test case against the biggest Irish ISP (EMI & ors v. eircom) for allowing its network to be used for unlawful downloading and the proceedings resulted in a settlement whereby eircom agreed to introduce a graduated response system.

The graduated response is to be introduced into UK law as part of the recently passed Digital Economy Act 2010. In that jurisdiction, it was subject to scrutiny, debate and critique by academics and commentators, which might not constitute scrutiny at all given that it sailed through Parliament. In Ireland, it is creeping in by private agreement between the main players (a development which is not unusual in Ireland).

The settlement between the industry and eircom had to be revisited in the High Court to determine its compatibility with the Data Protection Acts 1988 and 2003 and Mr. Justice Charleton delivered his judgment last week, concluding that the system can lawfully be implemented.

Professor Lillian Edwards said the following of the proposed UK system:

All a rightsholder need do, as presently laid out, is provide an IP address and time stamp of an alleged infringer to an ISP, and say that “ it appears to [them that ] a subscriber .. has infringed the owner’s copyright”. There is no requirement this belief be objectively reasonable. Nor is there any apparent sanction for malicious, or even simply careless or reckless allegations. Recent experience with the RIAA and BPI has shown that allegations made after IP address tracking at P2P sites often turn out to be wrong and that collecting IP addresses from P2P honeypots is a non-trivial exercise ; so the issue of liability for erroneous accusations is an important one. Libel, malicious falsehood and data protection laws may offer remedies for the falsely accused; but there is no mention of such in the Bill itself (so far), nor of any reasonable duty of care. In other words, all the power is given to rightsholders, and none of the responsibility. (My emphasis)

In his judgment, Charleton J. explains the eircom system as follows and Professor Edward’s comments would appear equally applicable:

Under the terms of the settlement, these companies tell the plaintiffs that a particular computer has been involved in illegal file sharing of its copyright material. This information is passed by one of the plaintiffs to the defendant Eircom, as the internet service provider. It then informs its subscribers that they have been detected infringing copyright. If there is a second occasion of illegal downloading, Eircom is obliged, when so informed, under the settlement to write to the subscriber warning them that unless that sort of infringement ceases, they will be disconnected from general internet service. This disconnection does not apply to any telephone or television service that a subscriber gets over their internet facility. On a third infringement, that discontinuance is implemented by Eircom: the subscriber is taken off service except for phone or television internet access.

Charleton J. acknowledges that disconnection is a “serious sanction” and that some would argue it is an “imposition on human freedom”. He quite rightly points out that “[t]here is no freedom, however, to break the law.” However, disconnection could affect an entire household, for example, and it is difficult to accept the justification offered that internet cafés are available to the disaffected and disconnected.

[W]hile it is convenient to have internet access at home, most people in Ireland have only to walk down to their local town centre to gain access for around €1.50 an hour.

Rightsholders are entitled to protect their rights, but should they be entitled to have a utility disconnected on the basis of their unscrutinised claim that the utility has been used to infringe their rights? As one wry tweeter put it:

Charl[e]ton J’s decision in eircom is as if NTR allowed to ban u from driving b/cos Quinn Direct said u crashed into 3 of its policy holders.

Part of the eircom settlement reportedly required the industry to pursue eircom’s competitors and seek implementation of the same system: rather weak letters before action were duly sent to all other Irish ISPs (including those who do not provide internet access to end users) and proceedings were instituted, due before the Commercial Court this summer. It had been anticipated that the other ISPs might defend the proceedings strenuously, though one wonders if Charleton J’s judgment might have any influence.

The most remarkable thing about the judgment is the fact that the Data Protection Commissioner, whose questions to the High Court formed the basis for the judgment, did not appear at the hearing because of  cost concerns.

One wonders what the purpose of the Commissioner’s is if not to appear in such a case. After all, his office appointed a panel of four commercial law firms to advise on the full range of powers and obligations under the Acts only a few months ago. His participation might not have changed the outcome, but as Ireland’s data protection regulator and representative member of the Article 29 Working Party (which has examined the nature of IP addresses under data protection legislation) his office’s participation should be automatic.

While Charleton J’s judgment ostensibly deals with data protection concerns, it makes his views on the wider issue of unlawful downloading clear. David Brophy points out that, not only was the Commissioner not represented at the hearing, nor was any consumer or digital rights advocacy group. He also notes the tenor of the judgment which, although ostensibly concerned with a set of data protection questions, is loaded with pro-indsutry language.

The judgment is particularly striking for the language used to describe the act of copyright infringement (“theft”, “stealing”, “filching”), and the data subjects, whose interests the case is of course addressing, become “copyright thieves” when their IP addresses have been identified as having been involved in file-sharing.

In fact, Charleton J. appears to take the plaintiffs’ assertions at face value and states that “the entire purpose of this litigation is to uphold the law.” He refers to “data protection entitlement” in the same paragraph as a “fundamental right to copyright”.

This appears to suggest that one’s data protection rights are a form of State-granted beneficence, to be measured against the human right of copyright. It should be remembered that, in this scenario, the data subject is an individual internet user; the copyright owner is a multinational corporation.

Updates

  • The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry welcomed the decision in Ireland, saying that it “sends a strong message to governments that are now considering how to help their creative industries address the threat of mass online piracy”. The IFPI says that the judgment confirmed the legality of a graduated response system, which is not quite accurate: the High Court decided that the settlement agreed between the parties was not incompatible with the Data Protection Acts.
  • UPC Ireland, owner of ChorusNTL, said that it will continue to vigorously defend proceedings brought against it by EMI & ors seeking the introduction of the same graduated response system. UPC rightly points out the point made above (that the decision merely decides on compatibility with the Data Protection Acts) and says “there is no basis under Irish or European law requiring an ISP to monitor or block subscriber traffic on its network.”
  • Cory Doctorow said that the judgment means that “Ireland has now joined the exclusive club of nations that treat the Internet as a trivial system for pirating movies, worthy of no special consideration. They’ve joined the club of nations that are willing to collectively deprive innocents of access to a single wire that delivers freedom of speech, press and assembly in order to put a few more Euros into the pockets of some of the largest corporations in the world.”
  • Ars Technica said “The issue isn’t about “freedom to break the law,” but about proportionality. Does the punishment fit the crime (which is not, in this case, even a “crime” but a civil matter)?”
  • p2pNet said “Whenever the IFPI … or any of Vivendi Universal, EMI, Warner Music and Sony Music’s other ‘trade’ outfits applauds a court ruling, you know it can’t be good for anyone except the Big 4. And when U2’s other big mouth, manager Paul McGuinness, chips in, it’s confirmed.”
  • Not an update as such, but Digital Rights Ireland published a post last year on why the graduated response agreement is bad for internet users. It still applies, post-Chartleton J’s judgment.

ECJ to decide on Irish hotel room royalties case

In general, if you want to show someone else’s media in public, you need a licence to do so. That licence can come from the copyright owner or, where the copyright owner has joined a copyright licensing body, that body has the power to grant collective licenses.

This collective licensing system enables shops, hotels, pubs and offices to use copyrighted materials on their premises without obtaining a licence from every songwriter, publisher or company to do so. These commercial venues must pay annual fees to the main Irish copyright licensing bodies (IMRO/MCPSI and PPI) in return for a licence which allows them to play music or use televisions on their premises.

A licence is required if the shop or pub merely tunes into the local radio station or cable news channel and does not create its own playlist. To take an extreme example: if a musician has joined IMRO and also happens to own a pub, that pub requires a licence even if it only plays looped recordings of the owner’s compositions, recorded exclusively in his or her home studio.

The extensive powers of copyright licensing bodies to extract royalties did not arise without controversy and IMRO appears to have found it necessary, in their FAQs, to offer an answer to the question: “Who says such a system is fair?”

If a commercial premises shows cable television, such as from BSkyB, it requires an additional licence in the form of a commercial subscription agreement, denoted by the presence of a pint-glass “bug” on-screen.

Hotel bars, nightclubs and common areas playing media require IMRO and/or PPI licences, but a licence is not required in respect of hotel rooms. This is provided for in section 97 of the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 which says that it is not copyright infringement to show media in sleeping accommodation or as part of the amenities provided exclusively or mainly for residents. The exemption does not apply where a specific charge arises for admission into that part of the premises where the broadcast is made. So, if you showed a Premiership football match in a residents’ lounge, but charged residents €1 per person to enter the lounge while the match was on, section 97 will not apply and a licence is required. (I have used the phrase “specific charge”, though section 97 refers to a “discrete charge”. This was actually the source of debate and it appears that it was intended to use the phrase “special charge”, but “discrete” survived enactment.)

Section 97 was included in response to lobbying by the Irish Hotel Federation. The reasoning behind the exemption is that royalties should arise where there is a public performance of a copyrighted work, but a guest in a hotel room is in a similar position to an individual in their private living room and therefore no public performance takes place. However, the European Court of Justice has previously decided that public performance of a recording can take place in a hotel room.

In a recent case involving a hotel in Kerry, section 97 was unsuccessfully pleaded in defending an action taken against a hotel which had shown Premiership football matches in the residents’ lounge without having the appropriate licence from BSkyB. Details of the arguments advanced are not available but it is possible that section 97 was found not to apply because the bar was not provided only for the use of residents (ie. non-residents could enter the bar and watch the matches).

PPI, the copyright licensing body responsible for collecting royalties in respect of copyright in recordings, wants the section 97 exemption to be abolished and taken legal action against the State to that end. Ms. Justice Finlay-Geoghan has referred a number of questions arising from the proceedings to the ECJ. According to the Irish Times:

Among the issues the ECJ will have to decide is whether a hotel operator, as a result of providing TVs and radios in guestrooms, is a “user” of copyrighted music that can be played in a broadcast for the purposes of EU directive 2006/115/EC. If the operator is such a user, the ECJ will then have to decide whether the same directive require the operator to pay a charge additional to royalties already being paid by TV and radio station operators. The ECJ also has to decide whether hotel operators are exempt from such payments on grounds the playing of such music is for “private use” as provided for under the same directive. A further issue is whether the directive permits the exemption of hotel operators from paying if the music is played by means other than TV or radio.

The IHF devoted a section of its 2009 annual report to copyright issues, stating:

The battle to protect our members against attacks by copyright and neighbouring rights holders continues … It is our advice that the state has a good case to defend. But the process may not end there as there is a view that this is an attempt by the major international record companies to have the case referred to The European Court of Justice with the hope of getting a favourable decision which would have Europewide effect … Should [PPI] be successful in their pursuit it would result in an annual cost to hoteliers and guesthouse owners of over €3m per year. The Council of the Federation recognises the risks in this case and have obtained legal advice on how to deal with this matter as it progresses.

Update (19 April 2010)

The questions addressed by Ms. Justice Finlay Geoghegan to the ECJ are as follows:

(i) Is a hotel operator which provides in guest bedrooms televisions and/or radios to which it distributes a broadcast signal a “user” making a “communication to the public” of a phonogram which may be played in a broadcast for the purposes of Article 8(2) of Codified Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12th December, 2006?

(ii) If the answer to paragraph (i) is in the affirmative, does Article 8(2) of Directive 2006/115/EC oblige Member States to provide a right to payment of equitable remuneration from the hotel operator in addition to equitable remuneration from the broadcaster for the playing of the phonogram?

(iii) If the answer to paragraph (i) is in the affirmative, does Article 10 of Directive 2006/115/EC permit Member States to exempt hotel operators from the obligation to pay “a single equitable remuneration” on the grounds of “private use” within the meaning of Article 10(1)(a)?

(iv) Is a hotel operator which provides in a guest bedroom apparatus (other than a television or radio) and phonograms in physical or digital form which may be played on or heard from such apparatus a “user” making a “communication to the public” of the phonograms within the meaning of Article 8(2) of Directive 2006/115/EC?

(v) If the answer to paragraph (iv) is in the affirmative, does Article 10 of Directive 2006/115/EC permit Member States to exempt hotel operators from the obligation to pay “a single equitable remuneration” on the grounds of “private use” within the meaning of Article 10(1)(a) of Directive 2006/115/EC?

« Previous PageNext Page »



Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 2,147 other followers