Everyday justice

Since the conclusion of the Lillis trial, there has been renewed media and public interest in judicial decision making, particular as it relates to sentencing.

Understandably, national media and popular interest is heightened in high profile cases like murder. District Courts handle a greater volume of offences, most of a comparably minor nature, and regional newspapers cover those District Courts in great detail. It is anecdotally thought that such court reports are a popular feature.

For the average citizen, an appearance in their local District Court is far more probable (though not exactly more desirable) than an appearance in the Central Criminal Court. Regional court reports are a useful guide to what one penalty one might expect to receive for driving without a valid tax or NCT disc, for public order offences or for violations of environmental or planning regulations.

Ian O’Donnell’s article in today’s Irish Times summarises the nature of judicial decision making in arriving at sentencing decisions in the District Courts and notes the importance of regional newspapers in documenting them. He observes that the reports tend to be neutral and dispassionate in style, unlike the often highly charged reports of serious crime in the national media.

In documenting outcomes, regional newspapers enhance the public administration of justice. They also reflect what Mr. O’Donnell terms the judges’ “optimistic view of human nature”, something that might not be popular with the law and order element of Irish society but which suggests judges are far less out of touch than is often claimed and are, in fact, acutely aware that many court appearances result from oversight, foolishness or societal factors.

As a group, judges seemed to attribute behaviour to internal, controllable and stable causes. Yet, contrary to what the academic literature would predict, they did not inflict harsh penalties as a result. This departure from what might have been expected is explained by the existence of a strong belief in the capacity of individuals to redeem themselves.

Demonstrating their belief in redeemability, judges were prepared to suspend prison sentences, or adjourn cases that could have led to a custodial sentence, to give the defendant an opportunity to demonstrate willingness to reform. They used the Probation Act and the court poor box to enable first-time or minor offenders to walk away without a conviction.

The guilty party was regularly offered a second chance, putting the onus on them to change. This was accompanied by a warning that the response would be harsher on any future occasion. These practices were designed to create a relationship of trust between the offender and the judge [...]

An examination of local newspaper coverage suggests that these variations are rooted, to some extent at least, in an optimistic view of human nature. This is to be welcomed. The continued existence of a faith in the capacity of the individual law-breaker to choose another path may offer some protection against the rise in punitiveness that has become so evident in other jurisdictions.

Freedom from the conscience of others

Breda O’Brien again makes the argument today, in a somewhat convoluted fashion, that some citizens of the Republic of Ireland ought be permitted to discriminate against others.

In fact, she goes further and suggests that Irish society will not be genuinely tolerant or pluralist unless a self-selecting category of citizen is allowed discriminate against another, naturally arising category. Leaving aside the specific debate about whether or not civil partnerships should be recognised by the State, such a proposal is incompatible with existing equality law and, if accepted, requires a fundamental reshaping of that law.

The Equal Status Acts 2000 and 2004 prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation (section 3(2)(d)). The Civil Partnership Bill 2009 provides for the registration of civil partnerships between same-sex couples. The Bill, if passed, will also amend the Equal Status Acts to provide that any reference to “marital status” be replaced with “civil status”. Accordingly, where it is currently unlawful to discriminate against someone on the basis of whether or not they are married, in future it will also be unlawful to discriminate against someone on the basis of whether or not they are or were party to a civil partnership.

Some are unhappy with this consequence and believe that, if a service provider or public servant is of the opinion that a family should consist only of heterosexuals, they should be permitted to refuse service to someone who wishes to have a civil partnership registered. They refer to this as a “freedom of conscience” or “freedom of religion” amendment, often shortened to the “conscience amendment”.

The more accurate term for such an amendment is a “permitted discrimination amendment”.

Opponents of the Civil Partnership Bill are, of course, entitled to make their views known and to lobby for amendments, but they should not misrepresent the nature of the amendment they seek. Neither should the media collaborate in such misrepresentation by repeating this misnomer.

To accept such an amendment would be to roll back the existing law on equality and not, as is suggested, to advance the case of religious equality. The battle currently being waged by Ms. O’Brien, the Iona Institute, Renew and the National Men’s Council of Ireland was lost when the Equal Status Act 2000 became law.

If one is prepared to accept the logic of the permitted discrimination amendment in the case of personal belief and homosexuality, there appears no reason why that logic should not be accepted in the case of the other eight grounds of discrimination, which are:

  • gender;
  • marital status (to be replaced with civil status);
  • family status (ie. pregnancy or being a parent/carer);
  • sexual orientation;
  • religion;
  • age;
  • disability;
  • race; and
  • membership of the Traveller community.

Ironically, the Oxford dictionary defines conscience as:

a person’s moral sense of right and wrong, chiefly as it affects their own behaviour.

Endnote: For excellent coverage on the progress of the Civil Partnership Bill, read the Human Rights in Ireland blog.

Total recall?

Section 2(1)(c)(ii) of the Data Protection Acts 1988 and 2003 provides that a data controller shall not process personal data in a manner incompatible with the purpose for which it was collected by that data controller.

Data protection law is not user-friendly and the full meaning of that rule is not immediately apparent; but one straightforward implication is that personal data cannot generally be disclosed to another party without the consent of the data subject.

Toyota is implementing a massive product recall due to complaints that some of its accelerator pedals stick, while other brake functions are inconsistent.

RTÉ News reported tonight that all Toyota owners would be contacted by letter in the coming weeks informing them of the recall, including those who bought the car second hand or by private sale. How would they contact such Toyota owners? The report said that the owners’ details would be obtained from the vehicle licensing authorities. How does this sit with section 2(1)(c)(ii)?

There are exceptions to the no-disclosure rule: for example, section 8(d) allows disclosure where it is urgently required to prevent injury or damage to the health of a person or serious loss of or damage to property. The important word is “urgently” and guidance from the Irish Data Protection Commissioner says:

This provision does not authorise disclosures of personal information for general health research purposes, or for other medical purposes where there is no immediate or urgent risk to someone’s life or health. In such cases, the normal data protection rules apply, including the obtaining of consent where necessary. (My emphasis)

So, section 8(d) does not permit disclosure.

Section 8(e) permits disclosure when it is required by or under any law or order of court. One such law (with thanks to TJ for pointing it out) was the Finance Act 1993 (section 60) Regulations 1996, which prescribe motor manufacturers and distributors for the purposes of section 60(3) of the Finance Act 1993, thereby providing them with the permission to inspect the records of the vehicle licensing authorities.

The issue of disclosing car owner details to a manufacturer for the purposes of a safety recall has arisen in the past and in Case Study 3/99 the Data Protection Commissioner was satisfied that disclosure was permitted on the basis of the 1996 Regulations.

However, the 1996 Regulations have been revoked and supplanted a number of times over the years, resting with the Finance Act 1993 (Section 60) Regulations 2005. The 2005 Regulations do not mention motor manufacturers and distributors, unlike those regulations passed since 1996. In Case Study 3/99, the Data Protection Commissioner expressed concern at the unqualified access suggested by section 60 and recommended it be reviewed. Could this be why motor vehicle manufacturers and distributors were excluded from the 2005 Regulations?

If so, and if disclosure has not been permitted elsewhere in the law when the change was made in 2005, on what basis can the vehicle licensing authorities now disclose Toyota owner details?

Facing up to mortgage arrears

FLAC is an Irish human rights organisation which advocates equal access to justice. It also provides limited legal services through the legal advice centres which give it the FLAC acronym.

FLAC is sometimes confused with the system of legal aid in Ireland available for criminal matters and for a very limited range of civil matters. Legal aid is state-funded legal representation; FLAC is a voluntary organisation which provides initial legal guidance but cannot represent people.

While FLAC is an independent organisation and not a quango, its evening advice centres are hosted in Citizens Information centres. They provide a service for all manner of legal issues where legal aid may not be available and where the individual cannot afford legal advice.

A contemporary hot topic at FLAC sessions is personal debt. In most circumstances, there is little a solicitor can do when arrears are properly due and cannot be met. However, there are practical steps that can and should be taken to deal with the matter. To that end, FLAC have published a useful guide to mortgage arrears which explains the terminology and issues and provides suggestions as to how arrears should be handled. Karl Deeter also outlines, in today’s Irish Independent, practical steps which a borrower might arrange with lenders.

Borrowers in difficulty should note that repossession does not follow from one month of difficulty. It is clear from repossessions that have occurred in the past two years that a long period of default usually precedes a repossession order, often coupled with a lack of communication from the borrower and no appearance in court. In fact, judges are showing particular lenience toward self-representing borrowers and offering numerous opportunities to reach some accommodation with their lender. Borrowers in difficulty should not, therefore, ignore correspondence from their lender but should follow the advice mentioned at the earliest opportunity.

See:

IP everywhere

Since 2004 most intellectual property litigation in Ireland has taken place in the Commercial Court, which is not a true court with jurisdiction separate to that of the other courts but rather is a list of the High Court.

The Commerical Court was established following the recommendations of the Committee on Court Practice and Procedure, of which my late father was a member, and offers litigants an involved case management system and fast-tracked procedures. For IP claims, there is no minimum claim value to qualify for entry. However, costs in running a Commercial Court case are a multiple of what one might expect in an ordinary High Court case.

Obviously not all disputes require such firepower but we don’t see much IP litigation in the District or Circuit Courts, where costs are lower and the lifetime of a case reasonably short.

One recent example of such everyday IP litigation concerns the payment of damages to a broadcaster for showing pay-tv in public without the appropriate subscription (ie. licence). From the Kerryman:

[A] hotel has been ordered to pay €5,174 in royalty [sic] to British Sky Broadcasting who told the court that the hotel had screened sports events in the bar without a commercial contract from the broadcaster.

Judge Ray Fullam heard that an inspector from IMRO had visited the hotel on four occasions in 2006 and 2007. During the inspections, the court heard, sporting events including English premiership soccer matches and Heineken Cup rugby games were showing on a television in the residents’ bar.

The hotel previously held a contract with Sky but it had not been renewed.

Counsel [for the hotel] argued that as the television in question was in a premises where sleeping accommodation is provided and amenities are exclusively or mainly provided for residents, for which there is no discretionary charge, the hotel was exempt from the need for a contract under section 97 of the copyright act.

Judge Fullam found against the hotel and granted an injunction barring the hotel from showing matches on Sky without a contract.

Nursing Homes Support Scheme

The new Nursing Homes Support Scheme is now in operation, having replaced the Subvention Scheme, and is already causing headaches for applicants and their relatives.

Background

In 2004, the Government announced that the means by which it had been charging long-stay patients in public nursing homes for the cost of their care was contrary to the law and had to be replaced. The Government attempted to address the problem by rushing the Health (Amendment) (No. 2)  Bill 2004 through the Oireachtas and by providing retrospective validity for historical charges. The presence of “(No. 2)” in the title of a bill is generally an indicator that it was born out of crisis or mishap.

The President convened a meeting of the Council of State to consider the Bill and later referred it to the Supreme Court to test its constitutionality, with the result that the Court found the Bill unconstitutional. The Supreme Court decision left the State open to claims for the repayment of illegally deducted charges and the HSE Health Repayment Scheme was established to deal with such claims.

The Govermment then set about replacing the Subvention Scheme with what was first known as the Fair Deal Scheme, a loaded phrase with which not all might agree, and which is officially titled the Nursing Homes Support Scheme.

Overview of the Scheme

The main features of the Scheme are that both State and patient contribute to the cost of long term nursing home costs and that the patient can defer part of that payment by obtaining a loan from the HSE. In summary:

  • The HSE carries out a financial assessment to establish the patient’s rate of contribution. This can range to a maximum of 80% of the applicant’s income and 5% of the applicant’s assets, both contributions arising on an annual basis. However, the 5% asset contribution only arises in the first three years of care (ie. it is capped at 15% of the applicant’s assets).
  • The first €36,000 of an applicant’s assets is exempted from the financial assessment (€72,000 in the case of a couple).
  • The HSE loan (the official term is Ancillary State Support) will most commonly be used where the applicant’s main or only asset is the principal private residence. Obviously, the Scheme should not require the applicant’s home to be sold to contribute the annual 5% contribution, so that element of the contribution is deferred and recouped from the sale of that property or from the applicant’s estate after death.
  • Whatever the rate of contribution by the applicant, it will never exceed the actual cost of care and all applicants will retain at least 20% of their income.

The Department of Health was anxious to ensure that the Scheme be a lawyer free zone; an understandable concern given its previous experience with the legality of nursing home funding schemes operated by it.

Implications

There is, of course, no reason why a solicitor should be required in order to apply to a State agency for receipt of an entitlement but two legal issues arise:

  1. the implications of the Scheme for an applicant’s assets must be considered; and
  2. what happens if the applicant is not in a position, due to illness, to apply?

The first issue can only be considered in the context of the applicant’s assets and personal circumstances. The Scheme may have unintended consequences and must be borne in mind when when dealing with assets, family transfers of property, when making a will or when executing an enduring power of attorney. For example, the financial assessment will look at income or assets which the applicant has deprived him or herself within the five years leading up to the application.

The second question is a topical one for solicitors, as the Scheme began to operate in early January. If the HSE loan is not required, a specified person may make an application on behalf of the applicant. A specified person is one of the following:

  • the Committee of a Ward of Court, duly authorised;
  • a person appointed by a registered enduring power of attorney which does not prohibit the attorney from making such an application;
  • a Care Representative (within the meaning of section 21);
  • a spouse or partner (within the meaning of the rather awkwardly phrased section 4);
  • a relative of the person who is not less than 18 years of age;
  • a next friend appointed by a court;
  • a legal representative of the person; or
  • a registered medical practitioner, a registered nurse or registered social worker.

These categories of person are specified in decreasing order of priority. If the applicant has diminished mental capacity, the specified person can make the application for State support. However, if an application for a HSE loan is made and the contribution from the applican’t assets to be deferred, it can only be made by one of the first three categories of specified person. More often than not, this requires the appointment of a care representative.

The appointment of a care representative is a limited form of wardship and is, therefore, subject to court oversight. It must be done on notice of motion to the Circuit Court, grounded by an affidavit sworn by the proposed care representative and accompanied by two independent reports, in a specified form, from medical practitioners (a bare letter from the applicant’s GP stating that the applicant has diminished mental capacity, for example, will not suffice).

The procedure to be followed and forms required are set out in these Circuit Court Rules and, while they would benefit from clearer drafting, are not overly complicated. The procedure is a good deal more complicated if the proposed care representative is, for example, a grandchild of the applicant. The procedure requires that documents be stamped and filed and the proposed care representative make a Circuit Court application in person. Many will be happy to do so but many more will not relish the experience.

Of course, the forms include the disclaimer: “You should consider taking legal advice on this document.” This is certainly the case as, if nothing else, errors or complications with the application process could delay it considerably and result in unnecessary stress for both the applicant and his/her family.

Hadji Bey et Cie

Hadji Bey's confections

A very pleasant weekend in Cork included a picturesque stop by the Port of Cork and a trip to the recently flooded Lewis Glucksman gallery in UCC, re-opened on Friday by President Mary McAleese. The current exhibition, Thingamajigs, is subtitled “the secret life of objects” and contains various items from local, private and public collections in Cork. The objects were everyday, but are no longer, and include the above exotic confectionary tins from Hadji Bey et Cie which, I have since learned, was a Cork institution and purveyor of fine confectionary.

The back story to Hadji Bey is fascinating, having been set up in the 1900s by Harutun Batmazian, an Armenian immigrant who fled the pogroms in the Ottoman Empire and exhibited at the Cork International Exhibition of 1902-3. He set up his sweet shop on MacCurtain Street in what is now the Metropole Hotel and lived at St. Patrick’s Terrace. By the time of the 1911 census he appears to have been thriving in Cork with a household including three children. Ireland was, at this time, part of the United Kingdom and Mr. Batmazian shows up in the British national archives as having been naturalised in 1915.

Sadly, it seems the business died out a few decades later when his son retired, but the Hadji Bey brand was set for a relaunch by Urney Chocolates last year. I have yet to see it anywhere, but the packaging is based on the the above original examples.

Pandora Bell, another recently established Irish confectioner, is based in Limerick and seems to have done well over the Christmas season. Despite Ireland’s economic woes, entrepreneurship is not dead and we may even be seeing the beginning of a new tradition of small indigenous producers in Ireland.

Law Society follows emergency guarantee fashion

In late 2009 the Law Society bailed out a specialist insurance broker which provides cover to about 60% of solicitors in Ireland. The guarantee resulted from a crisis not unlike that which led to the Government bank guarantee in 2008. It caused a significant hike in premiums and was a contributing factor in the closure of a number of firms throughout the country.
Irish solicitors cannot incorporate as a company and therefore cannot avail of limited liability. Accordingly, solicitors are personally liable when sued and are required by law to have insurance (referred to as professional indemnity, or PI insurance).
In the 1980s the cost of PI insurance shot up and the profession reacted by establishing the Solicitors Mutual Defence Fund Limited, a specialist insurance broker which is separate from, but effectively a tentacle of, the Law Society. The PI insurance market came full circle in 2009 with rumours of premiums doubling and worse.
A common refrain was that the profession was paying for the mistakes of Michael Lynn and Thomas Byrne, but that assumption is incorrect. Where a client is owed money by a solicitor they may make a claim against the Law Society’s compensation fund; if the money is lost due to the fraud of a solicitor, PI insurance generally won’t cover that loss (see d-f here). The true cause of the PI insurance crisis was bad financial investment decisions made by the SMDF.
Once it became clear, to the Law Society at least, that premiums were going to rocket, the initial approach was to tweak the mandatory requirements, for example by reducing the minimum amount of cover from €2.5 million per claim to €1.5 million. Solicitors’ insurance premiums would likely still increase and they would receive less cover than in previous years unless they opted to top-up their cover.
The annual deadline for renewing insurance cover is 1 December. In Autumn 2009 most solicitors were not hearing from their insurers about renewal. Concern began to grow, as did calls to the Law Society. This resulted in regular email missives from the Law Society to its members. Some of these emails were alarming, such as that on 20 November 2009 informing solicitors that delay was due to “uncertainty until very recently over whether the insurance industry would quote at all”. Others passed the buck, like that on 25 November 2009 asking the main insurance companies to backdate policies which were not renewed on time (with no mention of the regulatory issues arising from the intervening lack of cover).
The other emails are available here: 24 November 2009; 2 December 2009; 4 December 2009; 14 December 2009.
The Law Society’s statement that there was uncertainty as to “whether the insurance industry would quote at all” was interpreted by some as a rather scary indication that the industry saw the legal profession in general as high risk. It did nothing to suggest that the problem might have resulted from the SMDF’s internal problems.
In its 2008 annual accounts published in July 2009, the SMDF revealed the near total loss of value in a Saturn bond in which it invested one third of its portfolio through Bloxham Stockbrokers. When the loss of value of the Saturn bond became known, many expected legal action to be taken and the 2008 accounts stated that Bloxham intended to do so. On 1 December 2009, coincidentally the first day of the new insurance year, the SMDF instituted proceedings against Bloxham in the High Court (2009/10863P, since transferred to the Commercial Court).
On 15 December 2009, with the deadline for renewal safely passed and most solicitors covered, the Law Society revealed to members what was really going on.
On 22nd September, 2009, the directors of the SMDF had the first of a series of meetings with the Society. The directors informed the Society that, as a result of [the Saturn bond] losses, the SMDF would not be in a position to write indemnity business for the new insurance year beginning 1st December, 2009 …
The Law Society claimed that the SMDF held more than 60% of the PI insurance market and their withdrawal would result in either a complete market failure or a massive increase in premiums. Either consequence could result in a huge number of solicitors having no cover and having to cease practising.
The delays and damage, with human and commercial consequences, resulting from this dislocation of the entire Irish legal system could be incalculable.
The result was that the Law Society would guarantee a loan to the SMDF of €8.4 million by a commercial lender on the condition that it provide PI insurance for the year beginning 1 December 2009. This was done without informing members despite the fact, as pointed out by Vincent Crowley, that a debate on insurance issues lasting one and a half hours took place at the Law Society’s AGM on 5 November 2009.
Poor investment decisions are not new to the profession. In 2006 the Law Society paid €22.4 million for a 1.09 acre property at Benburb Street, ostensibly to provide extra space for expansion. According to a report of the purchase in the Law Society Gazette (April 2006, p.12), a lengthy debate on the proposed purchase took place at the Law Society Council, which voted unanimously to purchase the site.
“[O]ne Council member seemed to sum up the view of most when he said that ‘very few purchasers ever regret acquiring the site next door’”.
That appears to have been the full extent of the thinking behind the decision to purchase. Michael Irvine, president of the Law Society at the time, said:
I believe that the great majority of solicitors today, and in the future, will view the purchase of this Benburb Street site, like the purchase of Blackhall Place, as a wise and practical decision made in the long-term interests of the profession.
In 2009, the value of the site was written down to €7 million (Annual Report 2008/9, p.21; Phoenix Annual 2009, p.12). A feasibility study on the potential uses of the site was carried out after the purchase was complete, concluding that, due to current economic conditions, no development will take place.
When the deadline for renewing practicing certificates arrives on 1 February 2010, the Law Society will know which solicitors are operating without insurance and will take steps to close them. It appears likely that the Law Society will seek the introduction of legislation allowing solicitors to incorporate, perhaps along the lines of the UK’s LLP system. Another proposal that has emerged to remedy the PI insurance problem, but is unlikely to attract much support, is that the obligation to hold insurance be abolished. This suggestion is accompanied by the surprising logic that the existence of the obligation to carry insurance has led some solicitors to cut corners in carrying out their work, safe in the knowledge that they can fall back on their insurance.
If nothing else, the debacle may at least cause professional representative bodies to exercise greater care in managing their investment portfolios.

Wondering what they’ll scan next?

Two recent events have brought airport security back into the headlines:

  1. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s attempt to detonate explosives on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit, and
  2. a botched security exercise by the Slovakian authorities which resulted in explosives being imported, undetected, into Ireland.

These events have introduced another exciting and slightly terrifying technology: the full body scanner, the arrival of which in Ireland appears inevitable.

This technology raises, once again, the contemporary conflict between security and privacy. What is sometimes missed in the aftermath of a terrorist attack or attempt is that the conflict requires a balance to be struck, rather than one side trumping the other.

“The big question to [the US] is how to balance the need for personal privacy with the safety and security needs of our country,” said Representative Jason Chaffetz, a Utah Republican who sponsored a successful measure in the House this year to require that the devices be used only as a secondary screening method and to set punishments for government employees who copy or share images. (The bill has not passed in the Senate.)

“I’m on an airplane every three or four days; I want that plane to be as safe and secure as possible,” Mr. Chaffetz said. However, he added, “I don’t think anybody needs to see my 8-year-old naked in order to secure that airplane.”

As technology becomes increasingly sophisticated and invasive, the difficulty in finding the balance increases proportionately.

Some have already reached a clear conclusion: get over it. USA Today plays the out-of-touch politician card with opinion poll suggesting that 78% support body scanners, but legislators voted to ban the machines because they can see through clothing.

It’s a simple choice: safety over modesty, the same trade-off you make to get an annual physical. With the failed Christmas Day bombing plot fresh in mind, the Senate, which has yet to vote on the House bill, should do a better job of sorting priorities.

But this is not the choice facing citizens.

As Gerry Byrne points out, “there is a historical precedent for each security action.”  A corollary of this is that we are not finished with new security measures and are faced with the prospect of invasive security by default, backed up by a mentality that holds you have nothing to fear if you’ve done nothing wrong.

So, the obvious question is: what will they scan next? Unfortunately, we already know the answer: your brain.

It might sound improbable, but “mind reading” technology has been under development for some time. The challenge, for the developers, will be to differentiate between the passenger who is nervous because they plan on blowing up an airplane and the passenger who is just nervous because they have to travel on an airplane; but imperfections in a techology are no guarantee against its introduction.

Security agencies and worried passengers prioritise the implementation of new technological security measures as a source of comfort and are content to worry about civil rights and social issues later. Instead, these issues should be considered at each step. The development of a vast, information-hungry security system is already underway. Where will it stop?

Endnote: The contemporary importance of the right to privacy is handled expertly in an episode of The West Wing which covers nominations to the US Supreme Court and which culminates in a stirring monologue by Sam Seaborn:

The next 20 years it will be about privacy. The internet. Cell phones. Health records. And who’s gay and who’s not. Besides, in a country born on the will to be free, what could be more fundamental than this?

Fans of The West Wing might also remember a relevant 2004 episode in which press secretary C.J. Cregg is asked by a blogger about the development of mind control technology by DARPA. She treats the suggestion as ridiculous, but later discovers that there might be something to the story, albeit to do with mind reading rather than control.

In real life, something similar did happen. A privacy advocate working in Washington DC told me a few years ago of a wide-eyed acquaintance who suggested the existence of such technology. Thinking the suggestion crazy, he nevertheless lobbed in a FOIA request in the event something might come out of it. Sure enough, he received a sheaf of heavily-redacted technological specifications and presentations outlining the technology, then at the early stages of development. Truth really can be stranger than fiction.

Why these calls for the death penalty?

For reasons unknown, the reintroduction of the death penalty in Ireland has become something of a hot topic.

First, a recently retired and highly respected High Court judge calls for its reintroduction so that certain types of murderers “pay the price”. Then, John O’Keefe (Dean of Law at the Dublin Business School) agrees, referring to uncited research which apparently demonstrates the deterrent effect of the death penalty. His contribution is highly charged, with populist statements that range from the vague:

In truly civilised countries, murder means murder.

to the gung ho:

One thing of which we can be certain is that the murderer who receives a lethal injection is now deterred for good. It’s called permanent incapacitation and it always works.

He also raises the old chestnuts of criminals getting off on a technicality and enjoying greater comforts in prison than at home, and refers dismissively to “rehabilitation aficionadoes”.

Now, county councillors from Fianna Fáil and the Green Party have chimed in, despite their lack of a role in national matters concerning criminal justice or the constitution.

Speaking at the January meeting of the Mid-West Regional Authority in Ennis, Co Clare, Cllr PJ Kelly (FF) said that the fear of punishment for crimes among criminals no longer existed.

Mr Kelly said: “I believe that there will be a demand before long for the reintroduction of the death penalty for certain offences. I would support a public debate on the issue.”

Supporting Mr Kelly’s call for a debate on the matter, Cllr Brian Meaney (Green) said: “A debate on the reintroduction of the death penalty is something that would put the focus on the issue of crime and punishment.”

There is a moral argument against the use of the death penalty which people either agree with or they don’t. But many of those calling for its reintroduction do so in apparent ignorance of or disregard for our international obligations and recent history. The attitude of the European Union to the death penalty, for example, can be gleaned from the fact that it marks an annual European day against the death penalty.

The history of the death penalty in Ireland was neatly summarised by the Irish Times when reporting on Mr. Justice Richard Johnson’s comments:

The last person executed in Ireland was in 1954, when Michael Manning was hanged, with the sentence being carried out by English official hangman Albert Pierrepoint. No further executions were carried out and it was abolished in law in 1990.

The abolition of capital punishment is also a condition of EU membership and exists in a protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, to which Ireland is a signatory.

The 21st amendment inserted [in 2001] a clause preventing the Oireachtas from reintroducing the death penalty without a further referendum. It was passed in a referendum held the same day as the first Nice referendum by 62 per cent of those who voted, with 38 per cent voting against the ban.

In summary:

  1. Executions by death penalty were possible in Ireland until 2001.
  2. The last execution carried out was in 1954.
  3. A public debate and national referendum on the death penalty was carried out within the last decade and resulted in an overwhelming majority of the Irish electorate agreeing to its abolition.
  4. Reintroducing the death penalty would require Ireland to leave both the European Union and the Council of Europe.
  5. Reintroduction of the death penalty would, instead, join us with a colourful club of nations.

There appears no serious reason for this debate to be held at the present time and, Mr. Justice Johnson aside, can only be explained by “law and order” politics.

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